Secretary of State James A. Baker, III

Speech to the Aspen Institute, Berlin, June 18, 1991

I am pleased to be back in Berlin. When I visited you in 1989, the Wall had just become a gateway. When I returned in 1990, I took part in the negotiations to end the division of this city, this nation, this continent. And now, in 1991, I have the honor of meeting in the capital of a united Germany.

Yet as great as this progress has been, there is something else of lasting vitality we have created here. Berlin is much more than a city to Americans. Berlin is the birthplace of a special kinship between Germans and Americans. It is here that Germans and Americans, once adversaries, stood together. This is the place where we suffered, shared, and strove for freedom.

We started the transatlantic community here. And it is from here that we must extend it.

When I spoke in Berlin in December 1989, I outlined our ideas about the architecture of a New Europe and a New Atlanticism. We have made notable advances in this architecture for a post-Cold War era. Yet our vision must look beyond.

We must begin to extend the transatlantic community to Central and Eastern Europe and to the Soviet Union. These are the still incomplete pieces of our architecture. The revolutions of freedom in Central and Eastern Europe need our ongoing support to become lasting democracies. Perestroika needs our encouragement to move further toward a free society and free markets.

Our objective is both a Europe whole and free and a Euro-Atlantic community that extends east from Vancouver to Vladivostok. President Bush spoke in Prague about a "new commonwealth of freedom...rest[ing] on shared principles...that constitute our common values."

We are starting to build this larger Euro-Atlantic community here, in the eastern Laender of Germany. America's commitment to the unification of Germany did not end with the ratification of the "Two-Plus-Four" treaty. That's why I wanted to listen to some of the people of the East myself today, to see their home with my own eyes. That's why we have launched a comprehensive program to extend America's hand to all Germans.

I have no doubt that before too long this part of Germany will be one of the foremost engines in Europe. On that day, I believe Americans and Germans will be standing on the shop floor together. But we cannot rest with the integration of all of Germany.

The Atlantic Community: A Community of Values

To me, the transatlantic relationship stands for certain Enlightenment ideals of universal applicability. These values are based upon the concept of individual political rights and economic liberty rooted in European ideas of the 17th and 18th centuries and first planted in the new American nation.

While these values were originally associated with Western Europe and the United States, they transcend national borders. Indeed, those ideals stand in sharp contrast to some later 19th century views about the intrinsic qualities of societies and peoples, based upon history and heredity, which could allegedly find their highest expression in the state.

Ironically, perhaps, the narrow 19th century European nationalism also gave way to another, and a very different, rationalist and universalist ideology that would also transcend national borders--Marxism. In the Soviet Union, Bolsheviks blended this ideology with a Slavophile movement that was itself a reaction against allegedly alien Western values. Stalin imposed this ideology on half of Europe. Now its failures and destruction are obvious to all.

As the shackles of this failed ideology have been lifted or broken--in Central and Eastern Europe, in the Soviet Union itself, and elsewhere in the world--old 19th century nationalisms and animosities have reemerged. These forces cast shadows over the new democracies, particularly those seeking root in multiethnic societies. They expose anxieties about political, economic, and military security. They risk creating new divisions of Europe.

We need to offer an inspiration, even a goal, to these peoples rediscovering new values upon which they can build pluralistic, democratic, and free market societies. We need to picture their place in the new architecture.

Our architecture needs to fulfill the long-established NATO goal, from the 1967 Harmel Report, of achieving "a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe." To do so, our structures need to promote Euro-Atlantic political and economic values, the ideals of the Enlightenment. They need to establish the components of cooperative security for a Europe whole and free, and we need to demonstrate how integration can cope with new dangers from old enmities.

The Devolution and Evolution of the European Nation-State

Perhaps the most striking phenomenon across all of Europe today is the combined and simultaneous devolution and evolution of the nation-state. While the nation-state remains by far the most significant political unit, its political role is being increasingly supplemented by both supranational and subnational units. In other words, some of the nation-state's functions are being delegated "upward" and others "downward."

In Western Europe, the process of evolution has been striking. Over the past 40 years, West Europeans have transferred more and more functions from the national to the supranational level. The European Community has achieved history's most intense and comprehensive voluntary evolution of governing authority above the national level. The Atlantic alliance, for its part, may have achieved the most fundamental intergovernmental cooperation, for it is to NATO that Europeans as well as North Americans have entrusted not merely their prosperity but their personal and national existence.

In Western Europe, evolution has been accompanied by the devolution of power to state and local governments, to regions that sometimes cross national borders, and to the private sector.

In Central and Eastern Europe, on the other hand, devolution is certainly the more prominent phenomenon. With the collapse of communism, ethnicity has reemerged as a powerful political force, threatening to erect new divisions between countries and, even more acutely, within multinational states.

Yet even in the East, there is a simultaneous process of evolution underway. We are seeing the beginnings of a Europe of regions that may well be overlapping. Cooperation among Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia; the Pentagonale (Austria, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia); and the exploration of ties among northern states that rim the Baltic and of southern states on the Black Sea are examples of early efforts. Similarly, the "Nine-Plus-One" accord within the Soviet Union is a first effort to reestablish the legitimacy of that multinational state on the basis of voluntary association among component parts. Furthermore, the interests of these states in associating themselves with Western institutions like the IMF, the EC, and the OECD is also evidence of this evolutionary tendency.

Evolution and devolution are not alternatives, but complementary, and indeed interdependent developments. The building of a Euro-Atlantic community can only be achieved on a democratic basis if there is grassroots involvement in the process. Thus, the architects of a united Europe have adopted the principle of "subsidiarity," something like American federalism--that is, the devolution of responsibility to the lowest level of government capable of performing it effectively. By the same token, the process of devolution in the East will lead to fragmentation and conflict and ultimately threaten democracy if it is not accompanied by the voluntary delegation of powers to national and even supranational levels for basic matters such as defense, trade, currency, and the protection of basic human rights--particularly minority rights.

The United States is a nation of ideas, not of blood, birth, or creed. Americans know that many levels of government can coexist and cooperate effectively, and that one can thereby build a strong nation out of diversity. Throughout the Euro-Atlantic community, and, indeed, elsewhere around the globe, a fundamental challenge for democracy is to encompass, to represent, but also to transcend, ethnic ties on the basis of common--indeed universal--values.

The integration of Western Europe within the EC and NATO has virtually transcended all the old territorial disputes, irredentist claims, and ethnic grievances among and within its member states. Euro-Atlantic integration has made it literally inconceivable that localized disputes could become a source for serious conflict among these states. The incentives for cooperation within these multi- and supranational frameworks are overwhelmingly high in comparison with the remaining areas of discord. If we are to ensure comparable levels of peace and prosperity for Europe as a whole, comparable structures should be introduced to shape and develop interdependence among these countries.

In sum, in both East and West, the processes of evolution and devolution need to be kept in constructive equilibrium. Only by achieving balanced progress in both directions can the individual be assured a voice in the management of an ever more interdependent world.

Let me turn now to this architecture's essential structures--NATO, the EC, and the CSCE. I will examine how they have developed since December 1989 and consider how they might contribute to a Euro-Atlantic architecture extending from North America across Europe to the Soviet Union.

NATO's New Missions

So far, NATO's adaptability has attested to its vitality. It is, in fact, both a sturdy cornerstone and initiator of cooperative structures of security for a Europe whole and free.

First and foremost, our London Summit declaration paved the way for the peaceful unification of a democratic Germany.

Next our common resolve in the CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) negotiations resulted in a landmark agreement that will transform the military map of Europe. Within the past two weeks, the alliance's foreign ministers agreed on NATO's core security functions in the new Europe. We agreed that the alliance provides one of the indispensable foundations for a stable European security environment. It serves as a transatlantic forum for allied consultations and coordination in fields of common concern. It deters and defends against any threat of aggression against the territory of any member state. And it preserves the strategic balance within Europe.

We also agreed that the development of a European security identity would further strengthen the alliance and enhance its capabilities to fulfill these functions in the future, while encouraging an even more prominent European role in the process. The United States has pledged to support our European allies in the development of this identity and work with them in expanding cooperation between European and Atlantic institutions in the defense and security fields.

The alliance's new agenda, especially its political role, is evident as well in our plans to build partnerships with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We have proposed initiatives to intensify contacts among security officials, military authorities, parliamentarians, leadership groups, and scientific and environmental experts.

The new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe are already committed to our shared values; now we must focus on the practical relationships that will help promote and secure them.

These alliance contacts are also designed to draw the Soviet Union toward the new architecture. If reform in an increasingly pluralistic Soviet Union is going to succeed, we must reach out to the Soviet military and defense industrialists, as well as to reformers. We want them to know about NATO's strategy, doctrine, and defensive nature. They may be able to draw from our experience with civil-military relations. And we want to support efforts to convert defense industries to civilian production that will benefit the well-being of working men and women.

The EC: Continuing Integration and Support for an Eastern Agenda

The European Community's success at integration enables its member nations to benefit from common policies, preserve distinctive national attributes, and also devolve authority to local governments closer to the people. The Community is now in the midst of two intergovernmental conferences that will deepen its political and economic integration. As I said in Berlin in 1989, this was the goal supported by the United States of [Secretaries of State George] Marshal and [Dean] Acheson. And we support it today.

Of course, we do so in the expectation that a European union will assume a place as a responsible leader contributing to the strengthening of structures of global, as well as continental, interdependence. Our commonwealth of freedom must reach out further, to Japan and Asia, to Latin America, to Africa.

It is in this global context that the EC's energetic commitment to a successful Uruguay Round looms large. Unfortunately, EC agricultural policies have raised concern. While we recognize the important role that the common Agricultural Policy played in Europe's integration, we hope that Europeans now recognize that its continuation in its present form will injure developing nations and the GATT system. It would be tragic for the Community to send a signal of global insularity during the very year that it was achieving new levels of European integration.

The strength of the Euro-Atlantic community depends on cooperation between the Community and the United States keeping pace with European integration and institutional development. Our U.S.-EC declaration, completed late last year, reflects a first step on this path. Under Luxembourg's strong leadership, our contacts with the Council presidency and "troika" have developed rapidly and fruitfully. Similarly, we are opening new ties with the Commission in areas such as energy, competition policy, and privacy.

It is my hope that as the Community makes decisions on its own future, it will continue to develop the possibilities for effective interaction with the United States and others as global partners. The successful creation of a coherent internal structure for the Community should also strengthen its capacity for effective external relations and responsibilities.

In the near term, perhaps the EC's greatest external challenge is to reach out to the East. The EC's very political and economic success has already served as a magnet, drawing Eastern nations toward democracy and market economies.

The Commission complemented this appeal through its coordinating role for the Group of 24 effort for the new market democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. We hope this is but the first of many steps to removing the economic barriers these countries face within Europe. The Community's intention to negotiate expanded association agreements, consistent with GATT, is another stage.

It is a simple fact that the new market democracies will not be able to draw foreign investment, to privatize, to build competitive businesses that will create jobs if they are not allowed to compete fairly for markets.

I am optimistic that the European Community will meet this challenge of extending the Euro-Atlantic community eastward. Whether by example, supportive policies, association, ties with other regional groups, or even--if some day Europeans so decide--through further integration, the EC can help these market democracies establish a home in our larger community of common values.

Comprehensive Framework for a Euro-Atlantic Community

CSCE--the Helsinki process--remains the one group that brings together all the countries of Europe and North America on the basis of a common commitment to human rights and democratic principles.

These rights and principles are the foundation for a Euro-Atlantic community already reaching beyond Berlin to the East.

We need to build a practical record of success for CSCE, with appropriate capabilities in all three baskets in a mutually supportive fashion, and thus support the process of reform that will allow CSCE to become a true community of values.

Tomorrow, CSCE foreign ministers will meet for the first time as the Council of Ministers established in the Charter of Paris. I hope that over the next two days my colleagues and I will be able to take additional steps to enrich CSCE along the lines of the proposals [German] Foreign Minister Genscher and I made in May. We should adopt a procedure for calling emergency meetings of CSCE officials at the sub-ministerial level. We can strengthen the Conflict Prevention Center, and I hope we can also develop procedures under which ministers could direct the establishment of fact-finding missions.

We also need to entertain other ideas. [Soviet Foreign] Minister Bessmertnykh has made a proposal for a standing CSCE human rights body. This merits serious attention. It might be complemented by adding fact-finding missions as a fifth step in the Human Dimension Mechanism.

I propose we consider convoking a specialized CSCE meeting on support for free media. We might also expand the mandate of the Office of Free Elections to become an Office of Democratic Institutions so that voting day will be matched by 364 other days of liberty in the year.

In the economic area, I propose we establish new CSCE Chambers of Commerce in countries moving to market economies to organize and speak for the interests of private businesses. We might also organize a seminar on the social and financial implications of defense conversion and budget cuts.

CSCE is also an appropriate forum to address the issues of migration within Europe. An experts' meeting could seek to develop humanitarian principles for handling massive immigration and refugees within the CSCE region and cooperative arrangements to anticipate and address the causes and benefits of such population movements.

In sum, I envisage CSCE developing an agenda that can foster the sharing of ideas and cooperation on issues of common concern. That is a prerequisite to more complex integration.

It is also important that we view CSCE as a framework--not a unitary body--for the Euro-Atlantic agenda. Indeed, as we extend the Euro-Atlantic architecture to the East, we need to be creative about employing multiple methods and institutions--including NATO, the EC, the OECD, the Council of Europe, and others--to address common concerns.

Take the issue of security. We have in fact been developing arrangements for cooperative security to meet the needs of the newly emerging democracies and to engage a reformed Soviet Union.

One, CSCE will contribute by creating the political, economic, and security conditions that may defuse conflict. CSCE will also have systems to warn of potential dangers, mechanisms to attempt to mediate them, and ways to engage others to help resolve them. In this way, the structure would help avoid the conditions and bias toward escalation that characterized Europe in August 1914.

Two, NATO would provide a complementary role. A strong defensive alliance allows for lower levels of military forces and provides a foundation of stability within Europe as a whole. The arms control agenda pursued by NATO will augment this security. NATO's liaison missions will communicate the alliance's peaceful intentions, encourage civil-military relations, and contribute to a climate discouraging intimidation and aggression.

Three, such other integrating institutions of the Euro-Atlantic community as the EC, the Council of Europe, and the OECD are creating a network of political and economic support. This support both strengthens the new market democracies internally and signals to any would-be threat that these nations are part of a larger community with a stake in their success.

Finally, it is also important to shape the future security agenda in Europe to meet changing challenges, including the special needs of the East. The time has come to set new goals, which go beyond the concept of balance, and begin to establish the basis for a real cooperative security. To this end, I propose a three-tier agenda for future CSCE activities in the arms control and security area.

-- First, we need to institutionalize openness and transparency in our military affairs. We should intensify our efforts to reach and Open Skies treaty. We should establish a regular dialogue about military forces, budgets, defense plans, and doctrines. And to address the possible regeneration of forces within the Atlantic to the Urals region, we should consider measures that would provide early and clear indications of rebuilding efforts--not simply to avoid surprise but also to inhibit such moves.

-- The second part of our agenda is conflict prevention. Such milestone measures as the CFE Treaty and CSBMs (confidence and security building measures) agreement will all but eliminate the threat of a short-warning, massive war in Europe. But we also need to address more discrete localized problems within the CSCE area with the potential to lead to conflict between CSCE members.

-- These might include new measures to address some of the security concerns of particular regions. They might include new measures to cope with the problems of the Balkans or other areas where stability could be at risk. Some of these measures could be along the lines of arms control and confidence building measures. They might also involve a broader, political approach, such as supplying CSCE fact-finding, mediation, and peacekeeping capabilities when requested by nations immediately concerned.

-- Third is the challenge of proliferation: stopping the spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons--as well as the missiles that deliver them--and cooperating in the development of national policies to exercise restraint in the sale of conventional weapons. President Bush has called for a concentrated global effort to meet this challenge. We in the CSCE can contribute by building a partnership of responsibility and restraint.

CSCE members are some of the most important arms suppliers in the world. As an offshoot of East-West confrontation, some CSCE economies have become heavily dependent on exporting weaponry. This is a problem we must address together to find innovative approaches to the problems of defense industry conversion.

Taken as a set--the CFE Treaty and the manpower declarations being negotiated in CFE 1A; CSCE, including this new agenda for arms control; the continued vitality of NATO, including its liaison missions; the EC and other European institutions--we are building the basis for cooperative security in Europe.

Extending the Transatlantic Community to the Soviet Union

Our greatest challenge will be to extend the transatlantic community to the Soviet Union. While the new architecture can accomplish much short of that goal, it will be incomplete as long as the U.S.S.R. hesitates outside. Perestroika is an opportunity for "new thinking" in many areas--not only in foreign policy, where we have achieved much together, but also in defense policy, economics, democratization, Center-Republic relations, and human rights.

The revolution of perestroika has unleashed a new pluralism. The old political and economic structures have broken down, and it will take time to build new ones based on the popular will.

The elections in Russia and elsewhere are a good start. We need to engage the diverse groups, reformer and traditionalist, recognizing that coalitions will form, break down, and form again. The transformation of the Soviet Union will inevitably have its ups and downs.

It should be our ongoing objective, however, to reassure and even buttress this home-grown Soviet effort. Perestroika is a Soviet concept and a Soviet objective, driven by the realization that change is essential to reverse stagnation and deterioration. It is in the interest of the Soviet peoples to embrace a real market economy, democracy, and the rule of law. It is in our interest to support them.

I have spoken in recent weeks of the political, economic, nationalities, foreign, and defense policy context that could enable the Soviet Union to fulfill the hopes of perestroika. And I have spoken today of a number of ways that NATO, the EC, CSCE, and other Euro-Atlantic structures can serve as models for Soviet internal reform and international cooperation.

Yet I also recognize the United States, for reasons of history, has a special role to play in supporting the process of change in the Soviet Union. As the Soviets demonstrate the will to help themselves, to follow President Gorbachev's call in Oslo to "stay the course" on perestroika and the new thinking, then we can and should join them step by step.

As I said last week before the U.S. Senate, "[W]e can serve as a catalyst for political and economic reform. Indeed, we are developing a package of supportive measures, which we hope to coordinate with other Western governments."

The complete package is, of course, for the President to announce. But as we have pointed out in recent weeks, elements could include a special association with the IMF and World Bank to help design and implement serious economic reforms; a public-private project to resolve impediments to private investment in energy development, which can earn hard currency and provide an example of a successful sector operating with property and contract rights; a mutual effort to invigorate the food distribution sector to produce improvements for consumers soon through the establishment of market incentives; enhanced technical cooperation, including in the field of economic education; more open trade; and the additional $1.5 billion of credit guarantees the President authorized last week for the purchase of grains.

I hope President Gorbachev now brings forward a new effort at serious market reform that will enable us to advance perestroika--to advance a Soviet agenda and Soviet goals. The door to the Euro-Atlantic community is open. But only the Soviets can decide to step over the threshold.

The Euro-Atlantic Outlook

A half century ago, it would have seemed impossible that an American Secretary of State would stand in Berlin, speaking to Germans and Americans about the values of the Euro-Atlantic community. Particularly, that he would describe ideas about securing these values in the new market democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, extending them to a Soviet Union in the throes of reform, and indeed promoting these values in the world at large. But our predecessors have made the impossible possible. Now it is the turn of our generation to draw out and then help sustain the Enlightenment spirit. To do so, we must be idealists and realists, setting a goal, and then adapting our successful, workable transatlantic architecture to meet the new challenges of a post-Cold War era.

It is most fitting that in Berlin, Freedom's City, we would chart this course.

(Department of State Document 104, June 18, 1991.)